The entity remains a separate legal entity under the BAC capital structure with $3.8bn of direct Senior Unsecured and Senior Subordinated debt and an aggregate exposure around $6.5bn from all the sub-entities under the CFC entity. Of course, threatening the use of this legal route will not be a tidy process and will likely bring in doubt the rest of BAC’s capital structure to a greater or lesser degree and is unlikely to bode well for BAC’s capital market access and trading partners – but perhaps that won’t be a problem once the FDIC’s living wills are in place.
June 2012 sees around $2.3bn of the CFC entity debt due:
From the Bloomberg story:
The option of seeking court protection exists because the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank maintained a separate legal identity for the subprime lender after the 2008 acquisition, said the people, who declined to be identified because the plans are private. A filing isn’t imminent and executives recognize the danger that it could backfire by casting doubt on the financial strength of the largest U.S. bank, the people said.
The threat of a Countrywide bankruptcy is a “nuclear” option that Chief Executive Officer Brian T. Moynihan could use as leverage against plaintiffs seeking refunds on bad mortgages, said analyst Mike Mayo of Credit Agricole Securities USA. Moynihan has booked at least $30 billion of costs for faulty home loans, most sold by Countrywide during the housing boom, and analysts estimate the total could double in coming years.
“If the losses become so great, how can Bank of America at least not discuss internally the relative tradeoff of a Countrywide bankruptcy?” Mayo, who has an “underperform” rating on the bank, said in an interview. “And if you pull out the bazooka, you’d better be prepared to use it.”
and What Could Go Wrong?
Pitfalls include the possibility that a bankruptcy filing would cast doubt on the entire company’s willingness to support its other subsidiaries and damage Bank of America’s standing in the credit markets or with rating firms, hurting its ability to borrow, according to analysts.
“It’s not some sort of magic elixir that makes it all just go away,” Westbrook said. “I suspect that’s one reason they haven’t done it yet.”
and the fallout
Bankruptcy would be a “last-ditch option,” and possibly a costly one, because counterparties might become hesitant to buy the parent company’s debt or open trading lines with its Merrill Lynch unit, David Hendler, a CreditSights Inc. analyst, said in a Sept. 8 note. Credit-rating firms could downgrade Bank of America subsidiaries, which benefit from the implicit support of their corporate parent, he said. That would drive up the bank’s cost of borrowing.
“Most counterparties I speak to think this would be a very difficult option for Bank of America and unlikely to be sanctioned by regulators,” said Manal Mehta, a partner at Branch Hill Capital, a San Francisco-based hedge fund that has bet against the lender’s stock in the past. “The whole reason they would pursue the nuclear option of a Countrywide bankruptcy would be to put this behind them, but all you would be doing is opening up a Pandora’s box.”