Great Depression I vs. Great Depression II

In an important paper in 1983, Ben Bernanke argued that during the Depression, severe damage to the financial system impeded its ability to perform its economic role of lending to households for durable goods consumption and to firms for production and trade. We are seeing this process playing out now as loan funds for automobile purchases have withered. Auto sales fell 41% between February 2008 and February 2009. Retail and labor markets too are now part of the collateral damage from the housing debacle. Housing peaked in early 2006. Losses from the mortgage market began to infect the financial system in 2006; asset prices in that sector began to decline at the end of 2006. Meanwhile, equities and the broader economy were performing well, but as the financial sector deteriorated, its problems blindsided the rest of the economy.

Consumer and institutional indebtedness, in other words, were the means by which losses in the real estate sector were transmitted throughout the economy. And something similar happened 80 years ago:

The events of the past 10 years have an eerie similarity to the period leading up to the Great Depression. Total mortgage debt outstanding increased from $9.35 billion in 1920 to $29.44 billion in 1929. In 1920, residential mortgage debt was 10.2% of household wealth; by 1929, it was 27.2% of household wealth.

The Great Depression has been attributed to excessive speculation on Wall Street, especially between the spring of 1927 and the fall of 1929. Had the difficulties of the banking system been caused by losses on brokers’ loans for margin purchases in 1929, the results should have been felt in the banks immediately after the stock market crash. But the banking system did not show serious strains until the fall of 1930.

Bank earnings reached a record $729 million in 1929. Yet bank exposures to real estate were substantial; as the decline in real estate prices accelerated, foreclosures wiped out banks by the thousands.

The difference between now and then is that the Depression-era Federal Reserve contracted the money supply, whereas the Obama-era Fed has greatly expanded it. Gjerstad and Smith appear skeptical that increases in the money supply, or “quantitative easing,” will be enough to stop the contraction. America spent the last 20 years piling up debt - personal, commercial, public - and the bill has come due. Nothing changes that fact. The Great Deleveraging has begun.

Congressman Paul Discusses the budget with Legislative Aide

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDA7jv9IwvI&eurl=http%3A%2F%2F

“As our mountain of debt is projected to double with the new budget, many are wondering how long our country can keep this up before serious repercussions are felt. Obviously we can’t continue down this road indefinitely. Certainly, no country has ever prospered when their public sector spent half or all of the nation’s GDP. Yet we are saddled with leadership that seems unwaveringly convinced that the key to prosperity is public spending. This will be exposed for the lie that it is when our creditors wake up and call in our debt. The temptation at that time will be for the government to simply print up dollars in the amount needed. This type of debt repudiation could signal the end of the dollar as its value sinks to zero. We are seeing all the signs that this could happen. Certainly there are no signs of the alternative, which is paying down debt and taking the path of fiscal responsibility.” –Ron Paul

The Great depression II may officially kick off as the value of dollar collapse.

Related Posts:

• Fed’s warning
• “Being Too Big To Fail Is Okay After All?”
• Early economist Irving Fisher argued that the predominant factor leading to the Great Depression was over indebtedness and deflation; Almost 80 years later this looks very familiar, doesn‘t it?
• Current Recession vs. Previous Ones
• The middle class is really coming under an onslaught of issues.

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