In 1970, the financial sector was responsible for 12% of GDP; now it’s over 30%.
By Daniel at 16 December, 2009, 11:46 pm
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On Dec 16 01:10 PM Cambrian Capitalist wrote:
> The premise that financial innovation has not improved global productivity
> or economic growth is wrong.
>
> The simplest example of financial innovation facilitating economic
> growth involves the following: If I was a large corporation that
> wanted to construct a new office building in Manhattan with an initial
> budget of $2 billion, who is going to give me a construction loan?
> When can I transform that loan into a commercial mortgage? What will
> the costs of this financing be? The point is there are only a few
> financial institutions that can comfortably assume the risk of such
> an enterprise on a standalone basis. Because of the specific risk
> of such activity and the lack of potential competition at this level,
> it is highly likely that the financing costs associated with this
> venture will be very high. Without securitization, which allows banks
> to spread the specific risk of these activities around to a broad
> pool of investors, these activities would never get off the ground.
>
>
> Further illustration of this point is when the CEO’s of money center
> banks were called in front of Congress. Congressmen would ask them
> why they were pulling back their lending activity to which the CEO’s
> would respond that their individual companies had expanded their
> lending activity. They were not lying. The answer to why aggregate
> lending activity had declined was because the securitization markets
> (i.e. mortgage pass-throughs, CDO’s, RMBS, CMBS) was frozen and were
> liquidating. At their peak in 2007 the securitization markets were
> almost as large as the aggregate level of conventional credit assets.
> The point is that credit can no longer flow into the economy in the
> absence of functioning securitization markets. These markets are
> essential to the optimal allocation of financial resources in the
> United States and the world. Glass-Steagall is and was irrelevant
> to the hazards involved in the freezing of securitization markets.
> The central issues that drove the credit meltdown were derived from
> agency conflicts, and the improper incentives created by government
> involvement in subsidizing the overproduction of housing stock.
>
> Recreating Glass-Steagall is tilting at windmills thinking.
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