MCM operations even more difacult and time-consuming than they normally are. It does not take much imagination to suggest that the traffic in the Strait of Hormuz could be impeded for weeks or longer, with major air and naval operations required to restore the full oow of traffic.
Iran’s limitations, such as the command and control and targeting challenges it would face in littoral warfare, are not often appreciated. But its strengths are often overlooked as well, such as the stocks of missiles and much more explosively powerful mines it has acquired since the tanker wars of the 1980s. Likewise, although the United States retains the world’s best conventional military, its past experiences hunting mobile targets from the air and conducting MCM operations in the littorals do not inspire confidence that confrontation in the strait would end quickly. The United States’ fleet defenses have never been tested in combat against an adversary with large numbers of cruise missiles, and the United States is in the midst of a major transition in its entire concept of MCM operations. Given these realities, sanguine assurances about the course and outcome of military conduct in the strait seem unjustified at best, and dangerous at worst.
Most important, Iran does not have to seal the strait entirely to provoke U.S. intervention, and once that intervention begins, the potential for further military escalation is high. In particular, if the air and naval campaigns appear to be dragging on, the United States might be forced to consider holding hostage other targets in Iran or using ground forces. Either way, a significant and sustained increase in the price of oil would seem likely.
This analysis has significant implications for U.S. force posture and foreign policy. First, as a general matter, the analysis shows that despite a growing bi- partisan consensus on the need to expand U.S. ground forces, U.S. air and naval capabilities remain essential to the defense of Persian Gulf oil supplies. More specifically, the U.S. ability to reopen the strait hinges critically on two sets of scarce assets: dedicated MCM capabilities and air defense suppression capabilities. It is precisely because the United States has such a small (and shrinking) MCM that it would have to mount such a serious offensive effort to eliminate Iranian shore-based are. If MCM assets were greater in number and therefore more expendable, the U.S. Navy would be able to risk operating them in a less permissive environment, thereby shortening the amount of time required to reopen the strait.
Likewise, air defense suppression assets continue to be “high demand, low density,” constraining the number of offensive air sorties that can be conducted at any one time. This scarcity places an inherent limit on how fast any aerial hunt for mobile targets can proceed, unless the United States wants to incur an increased risk of shoot-downs. The importance of U.S. air control as- sets will only grow if Iran has the opportunity to acquire more advanced SAMs and aerial interceptors in the years to come. Greater U.S. investment in the suppression mission would be a boon not only to U.S. prospects in the strait but also against other potential adversaries, such as China and North Korea.
The United States should also encourage the use of more southern routes within the gulf, as water depths allow. The greater the area tankers are com-fortable traversing, the harder it will be for Iran to threaten the oow of that traffic with a small number of mines. Additionally, the farther from the Iranian coast that tankers can travel, the smaller the area within Iran from which mis- siles can be targeted at traffic in the gulf. Shrinking this area would reduce the difaculty of hunting for mobile missile batteries, as well as related air defense requirements, speeding how quickly the United States could conduct MCM operations in a permissive environment.
Above all, the scenario described here points to the critical importance of early detection of any Iranian mine laying in the Persian Gulf and especially the need to keep close tabs on Iranian submarine activity. Such surveillance depends not only on U.S. activities in the region but also on those of Iran’s gulf neighbors. If the United States wishes to continue to act as the guarantor of free passage in the strait, it needs to make these monitoring activities a clear part of a broader effort to discourage Iranian attempts at harassment or clo- sure. It also may wish to convey to Iran that, precisely because of the potential length and complexity of the operations outlined in this article, a campaign to clear the Persian Gulf of Iranian mines could quickly become a war to clear the Iranian harbors and coast of most remnants of the country’s military.
- GiantCaveBear
